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In the coming decades Belgium will phase-out nuclear and old fossil capacity while (intermittent)
renewable generation is expected to increase. We evaluate the occurrence of electricity shortages and
surpluses in Belgium in 2013 and 2017, aswell as the evolution of the load factors of flexible assets. Our sta-
tistical model for 2017 suggests surpluses of >2000 MW during 4% of the time. More alarmingly, the com-
bination of an unfavorable investment climate and a nuclear phase-out planwill increase the probability of
the occurrence of shortages in the near future. Therefore we suggest adapting the current priority dispatch
policy for renewables in order to improve the investment climate for flexible assets and reduce the surplus
risks.
 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Introduction
The Belgian case
Belgium has 7 nuclear reactors with a combined capacity of
about 6000 MW, resulting in a share of roughly 50% of nuclear
electricity production in the Belgian electricity mix in a normal
year [12]. These reactors were all built in the 70s and 80s and
are thus reaching their end of life. Since the beginning of the
century, the Belgian government has been debating the phase-
out of these nuclear assets. In the summer of 2013, the Belgian Fed-
eral minister for energy, Mr. Wathelet, received an approval for his
‘‘plan Wathelet” [24] which contains a timeline for the complete
phase out of the nuclear capacity. In 2015, the oldest reactors will
be closed down and the phase-out will be complete by 2025 [23].
Given the high share of nuclear energy in the Belgian electricity
mix, the planned phase-out poses a challenge to electricity produc-
ers, regulators and politicians.
Several other aspects complicate this challenge. For example,
investments in renewable energy technologies – mainly intermit-
tent technologies – did increase strongly and are expected toincrease further between now and 2020. The share of solar PV in
total installed capacity in Belgium is among the highest in the EU
[9]. Another challenge is the fact that many old thermal assets (coal
and gas plants) will also reach their end of life in the coming dec-
ades. As a result, about 6000 MW nuclear assets and 4000 MW of
thermal assets need to be replaced in 12 years’ time [12]. On top
of this, the investment climate in the Belgian electricity market
depends on the dynamics on the interconnected European electric-
ity markets. Belgium, being a relatively small country in the heart
of Western Europe, is strongly impacted by changes in the electric-
ity market in its neighboring countries.Literature overview
A growing number of studies are focusing on the problem of
integrating intermittent renewables in the electricity grid. Eurelec-
tric mentions in their ‘Power Statistics and Trends 2012’ report that
‘‘delivering on renewables will require adapting and developing
the entire energy system” [10]. On the operation of fossil fueled
back up they state that ‘‘the decrease of annual operating hours
for conventional plants leads to severe difficulties in covering the
cost of generation and removes any incentive for the building of
new power plants”. Agora [1] published a study on the German ‘en-
ergiewende’ and concludes that the increasing amount of solar and
wind energy will radically change the functioning of the electricity
market in a couple of years. They claim that base-load power
Nomenclature
FOD Federale Overheids Dienst (Belgian Federal Government
Service)
CHP combined heat and power
PV-system photovoltaic system
BM biomass
IN intermittent electricity production
CF capacity factor
LF load factor
FN scenario Full Nuclear scenario
NI-capacity Non-Intermittent Capacity (fossil, hydro, biomass)
MR Must Run
D1 Doel 1 (nuclear reactor)
D2 Doel 2 (nuclear reactor)
T1 Tihange 1 (nuclear reactor)
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important. They advocate a new type of energy market which puts
a value on flexibility and on security of supply. Also, activating the
demand side is, in their view, very important [1]. A report from
OECD’s Nuclear Energy Agency also mentions big losses in the prof-
itability of fossil power plants as the share of variable renewables
increases. When it comes to nuclear, the report mentions that a
reactor start up time of several hours to sometimes days, combined
with a low marginal production cost, makes it (economically)
impossible for (old) nuclear power plants be operated in a flexible
way. Older nuclear plants cannot operate below 50% of their capac-
ity during a prolonged period. New reactors, on the other hand, can
be more flexible [20].
Most of the scientific literature focuses on the German ‘en-
ergiewende’. One paper found the impact of the nuclear phase out
in Germany on system costs and electricity prices to be significant,
and a substantial transformation of the supply side and demand side
would be required to copewith the German Phase out [14]. Another
paper concluded that the German phase out would result in an
increase in overall greenhouse gas emissions and that the growth
of renewables would require an expansion of the transmission
capacity [2]. Focusing more on the intermittency issues, Grave
et al. [15] found that the rise in wind and PV will have a substantial
impact on the full load hours of thermal plants. According to Grave
et al. [15], the full load hours for gas plants in Germany could be as
low as 2000 (corresponding with a load factor of only 23%) by
2030. The authors conclude that ‘‘electricitymarket designwill have
to provide incentives to invest into generation capacity which will
have low utilization in the future” [15].
These recent studies clearly indicate that the energy landscape
in Central West Europe (CWE-region) will change drastically in the
next two decades. The combination of a nuclear phase out (in Bel-
gium and Germany) with an increasing amount of renewables and
a decreasing profitability of thermal power plants will be very
challenging.
Other regions are also confronted with the issue of integrating
renewables in a system with nuclear capacity. Zhang et al. [25]
have focused on this problem in a Japanese context. They used
hourly data on electricity demand in the Japanese region of Kansai,
combined with a weather based model for the inflow of PV and
wind electricity. The impact of new technologies such as batteries,
electric vehicles and heat pumps was also studied. They find that
the combination of high shares of PV and nuclear will result in a
lot of excess electricity production. However, the introduction of
heat pumps, electric vehicles and batteries can to some extent
reduce this excess production [25]. A study from Denholm and
Hand [5] analyses the impact of variable renewables generation
input in various scenarios in Texas (USA) in the ERCOT electricity
area. Their data on wind and PV production is based on wind and
PV resource maps in the state of Texas. They perform hourly sim-
ulations on increasing shares of variable generation (wind and
solar energy) in the current ERCOT area. They find that the
introduction of high shares of variable generation capacity will
increase the need for flexible assets and requires the eliminationof the minimum generation constraints imposed by ‘‘must run”
generation assets. If the penetration of variable generation reaches
shares of about 50% of total generation, curtailment of about 5% of
the variable assets would be required, depending on the scenario
[5].Contribution to the literature
The above literature overview shows that the problem of inte-
grating variable renewables has become an important issue in
recent years. This paper contributes to the existing literature in
various ways. Firstly, in this paper we focus on the Belgian situa-
tion. The large share of nuclear and the increasing inflow of renew-
ables with priority dispatch will have a huge impact on the
operation of the remaining thermal assets in Belgium and the sta-
bility of the electricity market in general, already in the next
5 years. Because of the short time scope of the study, we exclude
possible future options for grid flexibility such as batteries and
electric vehicles. We also exclude the option of constructing new
transmission lines, since this requires a lot of time and planning.
Secondly, we present a unique methodology, based on 15 min
interval data for electricity demand and production from wind tur-
bines and PV-systems. This methodology is different from most
papers, which use weather data as a proxy for PV and wind output.
In our view, a model based on real, measured output of PV and
wind is a contribution to the existing models. Thirdly, in contrast
with most papers, we do not use an ‘‘optimal” investment or dis-
patching model. Instead, we look at the current ‘‘sub-optimal” sit-
uation, where all renewables have priority dispatch and incentives
for thermal capacity are virtually absent.
In summary, we compare current and future demand and supply
in order to have a better idea on how the increasing share of renew-
ables, combinedwith thephase out of oldnuclear and thermal assets
will affect the grid stability and the functioning of the electricity
market. To our knowledge, this is the first ever study to quantify
on a ‘‘% of time” basis the amount of surpluses, shortages andflexible
assets’ running hours in Belgium. Themethodology used here can be
applied to other nations aswell, especially thosewith a high share of
(intermittent) renewables. We will start by introducing the current
situation in Belgium. This will be followed by an elaboration on the
model thatwasused to analyze the shortages, surpluses andnumber
of full loadhours forflexible generation. Then, the resultswill bepre-
sented and discussed. Finally we will conclude and provide some
policy recommendations.Methodology
Introduction
In order to interpret the results, it is important to have some
insights in the current Belgian situation. In 2013, wind and PV
had a share in total installed capacity of 6% and 12% respectively.
Nuclear has the highest share in total capacity, closely followed
Wind 
6% PV 
12% 
Hydro 
1% 
Coal 
2% Nuclear 
28% Gas 
21% 
pumped storage 
6% 
Peak  
6% 
Must Run 
(BM+CHP) 
18% 
Belgium 2013 
 Installed capacity 
(MW) 
Fig. 1. Installed capacity in Belgium 2013 (data from [12,9].
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demand for electricity: CHP and biomass plants).
However, due to large differences in full load hours, the overall
share of nuclear and gas is relatively high. Nuclear is providing
some 50% of total electricity supply and gas about 30%. The share
of renewables in the total electricity mix was roughly 12% in
2012 [12] and this should increase to about 20% by 2020. [11].
As mentioned before, the ‘‘Plan Wathelet” is a key policy docu-
ment presenting the timeline of the phase out. The total amount of
installed nuclear capacity today is about 6000 MW. This will be
phased out completely by 2025 according to this plan. In this paper
we will focus on the short term issues (2013–2017) resulting from
the first step of this phase out. We focus on the short term because
there are less uncertainties and because a recent report by the Fed-
eral Agency ‘‘FOD Economy” has highlighted that system adequacy
issues could already appear in the coming years. We expand the
scope of the FOD-report by using a different model and focussing
not only on the problem of shortages, but also on the surplus issues
and the issue of decreasing load hours for gas plants. Fig. 2 indi-
cates the rise in renewables and the drop in Non-Intermittent
capacity (NI-assets) in the short term in the Belgian electricity
market, if the Plan Wathelet will be executed as planned. The total
installed capacity will stay more or less constant, but the total non-
intermittent capacity (including nuclear) will drop from about
17,000 MW in 2013 to only 14,000 MW in 2017.
Since Belgium is a small country, its import/export capacity is
relatively big compared to the domestic electricity supply. Belgium
has a direct connection with France and The Netherlands. The
import capacity is equal to 30% of peak demand. In absolute fig-
ures, Belgium could (commercially) export 2971 MW and import
a total of 4244 MW in 2012. However, in 2012, the BE-FR connec-
tion was saturated during 13% of the time and the NL-BE connec-
tion was saturated during 22.5% of the time [4]. By consequence,
we can assume that more interconnection would be beneficial
for the security of supply in Belgium. However, given the short
timeframe of this study (2013–2017) an increase of the intercon-
nection capacity is technically not a viable solution to mitigate
the problems discussed in this paper. The newly planned intercon-
nection – Nemo Link – with the UK is planned to be operational
by 2019 [19]. The interconnection with Germany– ALEGrO– is also
planned to be operational in 2019 [7]. So, until 2019 the import
capacity of Belgium remains at 4244 MW.0 
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Fig. 2. Growth in renewables and drop in non-intermittent assets – nuclear phase
out according to Plan Wathelet [23].Assumptions
In this paper the Belgian electricity system is analyzed from an
island perspective. This assumption makes it much easier to model
the system, but unfortunately makes the interpretation of the
results less straightforward. However, this report is focusing on
the issues of shortages and surpluses, in these extreme moments
the interconnection capacity is likely to be saturated. One event
in February 2012 is a striking example of the problems occurring
during a shortage. On this day there was a huge demand for elec-
tricity in Belgium and France, resulting in a strong increase of the
import from the Netherlands, however, since Belgium is a transit
country, a large part of the electricity imported by Belgium was
exported to France. This resulted in the paradoxal situation that
the interconnection with France had a negative impact on the
security of supply in Belgium [3]. Given these insights, when it
comes to shortages, the ability to import electricity appears lim-
ited. A surplus, on the other hand, can be managed in various ways,
such as exporting, load shedding or scheduled outages (in
summer).
Data and model
The biggest uncertainties regarding the estimation of shortages
and surpluses in the future are; firstly, the capacities of the various
technologies, secondly, the demand patterns and thirdly, the vary-
ing weather patterns that dictate the energy provided by wind and
PV. The first uncertainty is coped with by assuming three phase out
scenarios (see section ‘Phase out scenarios’). In principle, the ‘‘plan
Wathelet” should be followed, but it is interesting to see what
would happen if there would be a stronger phase out or no phase
out at all (for example due to security of supply issues). The issue
of predicting the demand patterns is dealt with by using the
demand patterns of the last 8 years (2005–2012). This data was
found on the website of the Belgian TSO [6]. The advantage of this
database is that data from before and after the recession is avail-
able. Our analysis thus contains years with low demand (2011,
2012) and years with high demand (2007, 2008). If demand would
increase in the next years, the pre-crisis data would provide the
most reliable results, if not, the most recent data would be better.
However, it is currently difficult to predict the evolution of electric-
ity demand therefore we have chosen to use the whole dataset of
8 years. The demand data will be discussed in more detail below
(Section ‘Final model’). The issue of variable renewable input was
tackled by using a bootstrap-like method to simulate possible
future supply and production patterns based on data for wind
and PV production in Belgium from February 2012 to February
2013. This model is the core of the analysis and will be explained
in more detail below.
Wind production model
Wind data for Belgium was available for the period 02/2012–
02/2013 and retrieved from the website of Elia. The wind data is
provided in 15 min intervals. Fig. 3 shows the pattern of wind pro-
duction for a monitored capacity of 930.65 MW during the first
months of 2012 in Belgium. The graph clearly illustrates that the
availability of wind is very variable and can occasionally have high
peaks (800 MW in January). On the other hand, long periods of very
low wind production are also possible (3rd week of March, where
between 11/03/2012 and 15/03/2012 the capacity does not go
above 100 MW).
Using only one year of data can have a major impact on the
results. Therefore, a random wind generation pattern was created
by at random selection of 5 days of wind from the data which were
then put in a random order. This was repeated until a whole year of
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Fig. 3. Wind production in Belgium from 19/01/2012 to 29/03/2012 (930.65 MW – data from [6].
2 New nuclear assets can be used in a more flexible way [20], but the Belgian
nuclear fleet is old and not flexible.
3 90 €/MW h for biomass and 100–110 €/MW h for biogas (http://www.vreg.be/nl
minimumsteun-certificaten).
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ate an almost infinite amount of yearly wind patterns. This step
was repeated until 100 year-wind patterns were created.
Unfortunately, in this way the seasonal variation was lost. Luck-
ily, seasonal variation in wind speeds in Belgium is rather limited,
with average wind speeds of 3 m/s in summer and 3.7 m/s in win-
ter [16]. Also, keep in mind that wind electricity production is not
linearly related to average wind speeds, the relation is much more
complicated. Using actual electricity production data is an advan-
tage compared to using weather data (which is often used in the
literature) since this approach also takes into account special
events like unexpected outages and also because modeling or pre-
dicting wind electricity production is not straightforward [18,13].
PV production model
The pattern of PV-electricity production is obviously very differ-
ent from that of a wind turbine. PV-electricity production varies in
essence in two time dimensions, firstly, the day/night pattern
which makes it fluctuate daily from zero to a peak and back again
to zero, and secondly, the seasonal variation which makes PV more
productive in summer compared to winter. Because of these spe-
cial properties, the PV-production model is different from the wind
model. Elia provides forecasted PV production data for a monitored
capacity of 1600 MW from 02/2012 until 02/2013. Fig. 4 shows
that even on a winter day the peak can be relatively high
(>1000 MW). Also, it can be cloudy during relatively long periods
(27th of February – 3rd of March).
The random generation model for PV production was split up in
months, in order to account for the seasonal variation. For a given
day in a given month, the average monthly production curve was
multiplied with a correction factor to create a fluctuating daily
pattern.
PVd ¼ AVm  C ½MW
With:
PVd = Daily pattern for PV production [MW].
AVm = Average daily pattern for a given month [MW].
C = Correction factor [–].
This correction factor was chosen ‘‘at random” from the avail-
able PV production data (Fig. 5), based on the daily peak output
of 1600 MWp of PV capacity monitored by Elia [6]. Combining
the 12 months resulted in a random PV production pattern for a
given year. The model creates random PV production patterns that
result in yearly capacity factors between 10% and 12% for PV in Bel-
gium, which is normal for this region.
Final model
The before mentioned PV and wind modeling was repeated 100
times in order to have a robust set of production patterns – cloudyand sunny periods, windy and non-windy periods – to be used in
the electricity production model. If we divide these patterns, based
on 2012 data, by the monitored capacity (1600 MW of PV and
930.65 MW of wind) we obtain a random pattern that can be mul-
tiplied with any installed capacity to obtain a new production pat-
tern with a higher magnitude. If we combine 100 PV and 100 wind
profiles, we obtain 10.000 combinations of intermittent electricity
production.
To estimate the amount of surpluses, the intermittent pattern
was added to the total electricity production of nuclear and must
run (Biomass and CHP). For this we assumed a continuous output
of these assets (nuclear is technically inflexible,2 biomass and
CHP are inflexible due to the current legislation which grants them
priority dispatch). The properties of the must run assets were based
on the study by the FOD Economy on the Belgian electricity market
[12]. Basically, CHP plants are mostly following heat demand,
instead of electricity demand; therefore these assets are not used
in a flexible way. For biomass, the renewable energy subsidies (green
certificates) are given for each MW h of electricity produced,3 thus,
these plants are incentivized to run as much as possible. For the
nuclear capacity we assumed an availability of 85%, for the must
run capacity an availability of 70% was assumed. Gas plants are
assumed to be used in a flexible way to balance the remaining
demand. Since the issue of priority dispatch is one of the main topics
of this paper, we have added an alternative scenario in which the
priority dispatch for must run assets is banned, and the biomass
and CHP units are used more flexibly. In this ‘‘Flexible Must Run sce-
nario” the minimal load factor of the must run assets is estimated to
be 35% (see section ‘Flexible Must Run scenario’).
In order to estimate surpluses (or shortages) we need to com-
pare the data from the production model with data on electricity
demand in Belgium. In Table 1 the total annual demand, peak load
and minimal load in Belgium for 2005–2012 is shown. The demand
patterns (15 min interval) for these years were used in the model
(see below). The years 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2010 clearly
had a higher annual demand compared to 2009 (when the crisis
hit) and 2011 and 2012.
We then compare the historical demand profiles with the
10.000 production profiles (100  100). A Matlab model was used
to estimate how many times (how many 15 min intervals) there is
a shortage or a surplus in a given year. Also, the benchmark was
changed to estimate the height of a shortage or surplus
(1000 MW, 2000 MW . . .). For a given demand profile and for one
production profile, the formula is as follows:
Surplus : INþMR þ NUC > D or INþMR þ NUC D > 0
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Fig. 4. Forecasted PV production in Belgium from 17/02/2013 to 09/04/2013 (1600 MW) (Data from [6].
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Fig. 5. Daily peak output of PV-systems in Belgium (based on data from [6].
Table 1
Peak load, minimal load and total electricity demand in Belgium (2005–2012) (data
from [6].
Year Peak load Minimal load Demand
(MW) (MW) (TW h)
2005 13,603 6168 87
2006 13,702 6520 89
2007 14,040 6464 89
2008 13,479 6393 88
2009 13,531 5901 82
2010 13,845 6278 87
2011 13,208 6232 83
2012 13,362 5845 82
342 R. Laleman, J. Albrecht / Electrical Power and Energy Systems 74 (2016) 338–347IN = Intermittent production (PV + wind).
MR = Must Run (biomass + CHP).
NUC = Nuclear.
D = Demand.
Fig. 6 depicts a visualization of a surplus analysis. A surplus
occurs when the colored regions are higher than the black line,
notice that even without intermittent production we can have a
surplus, when nuclear and must run combined are higher than
demand (in the middle of the picture, the black line falls below
the blue zone).
With only a small modification the model can be used to esti-
mate the probability of a shortage. In this case we assume that
all controllable assets are available and that intermittent renew-
ables can – if the wind is blowing and/or the sun shining– also con-
tribute. For calculating the shortages the following formula was
applied:
Shortage : D > INþMR þ NUCþ Gasþ Coalþ PeakþHydro
Also, an estimate of the load factor for the flexible (gas fired)
capacity can be obtained from the model. The ‘‘Flex Gap” (the
Gap between the demand and sum of intermittent renewables(IR), must run (MR) and nuclear (NUC) production) refers to the
amount of time the flexible share of the production park needs
to produce electricity in order to meet the demand:
Flex Gap : INþMR þ NUC < D or INþMR þ NUC D < 0
Finally, as mentioned above, we repeat the surplus and ‘‘flex gap”
analysis with a lower LF for the Must Run assets. For this we
assumed that the minimal load factor of the must run assets is equal
to 35%.
The probability of surpluses, shortages and flexible assets’ run-
ning hours are analyzed statistically. In order to give a clear under-
standing of the model, we present Fig. 7, showing the probability of
a surplus for one demand profile (demand of 1 year). Using only
one year of demand data, we clearly see the effect of the random-
ization of the intermittent renewables’ output. The distribution
shows the n of 15 min intervals that a surplus occurs.
If we apply this to the other demand patterns (all 8 years of
data) and combine the results, a more peculiar distribution func-
tion is obtained, which consists of several gauss-like distributions
compiled (Fig. 8). The big peak in the range of a 22–27% ‘‘surplus
risk” indicates that there are three years with a high and overlap-
ping demand pattern in the sample of 2005–2012. Obviously, there
will be a lower chance of having a surplus in a year with a high
demand (and vice versa). In the results section below, the average
(Cum Distr. = 50%), minimal (0%) and maximal (100%) values
obtained from a distribution similar to the one presented in
Fig. 8 will be mentioned. Also, instead of the n of 15 min intervals
we will mention the results in % of time (over a whole year) to
facilitate interpretation.
Phase out scenarios
The nuclear phase out will result in a sharp decrease of the Non-
Intermittent capacity (NI-capacity) available in Belgium by 2017
(Table 2). Based on the ‘‘plan Wathelet” we decided to evaluate 3
scenarios. The first scenario is a theoretical scenario in which all
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Table 2
Supply side scenario’s for Belgium in 2013 and 2017 (based on data from [12] & [9].
Supply scenario’s 2013 2017 FN 2017 D1D2 2017 D1D2T1
Capacity (MW) (MW) (MW) (MW)
Nuclear 5927 5927 5061 4099
Must Run 3809 3846 3846 3846
Total NI (Fossil + Hydro + Nuclear + BM) 17,065 14,464 13,598 12,636
PV 2400 3800 3800 3800
Wind 1302 3421 3421 3421
Total 20,767 21,685 20,819 19,857
R. Laleman, J. Albrecht / Electrical Power and Energy Systems 74 (2016) 338–347 343plants are kept online and the nuclear capacity in 2017 is equal to
5927 MW. This ‘‘Full Nuclear” scenario (FN-scenario) is considered
unrealistic, but it serves as an interesting benchmark. In the second
scenario only the two oldest reactors are phased out (Doel 1 and 2,
433 MW each) and this will be referred to as the D1D2-scenario.
This is the scenario as presented in the ‘‘Plan Wathelet” and
consequently the most likely scenario. In the third scenario we
include the phase out of Tihange 1, resulting in a decrease in
nuclear capacity of about 1.8 GW (D1D2T1-scenario). Meanwhile,investments in wind and PV will increase, resulting in an estimated
capacity of 3421 MW and 3800 MW respectively by 2017 [12,9].
Results
Shortage risk
We evaluate the risk of a shortage in 2 ways. A first analysis was
carried out based on the logic that a shortage is assumed to occur
Table 3
Results of the shortage analysis in 2013 and 2017, with or without the contribution of intermittent renewables.
Shortage (MW) 2013 2017 D1D2T1 2017 D1D2 2017 FN
Min (%) Av (%) Max (%) Min (%) Av (%) Max (%) Min (%) Av (%) Max (%) Min (%) Av (%) Max (%)
>0 0 0 0 3.3 8.5 15.4 0.6 2.7 6.5 0.0 0.5 1.6
>1000 0 0 0 0.4 1.9 5.0 0.0 0.2 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.1
>2000 0 0 0 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
>3000 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2017 D1D2T1 NO RES 2017 D1D2 NO RES 2017 FN NO RES
Min (%) Av (%) Max (%) Min (%) Av (%) Max (%) Min (%) Av (%) Max (%)
>0 15.9 28.7 40.7 5.8 12.3 19.8 1.0 3.8 7.1
>1000 4.1 9.7 15.7 0.4 1.8 3.7 0.0 0.1 0.3
>2000 0.2 1.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
>3000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Table 4
Results of ‘‘priority dispatch” surplus analysis for 2013 and 2017.
Surplus (MW) 2013 2017 D1D2T1 2017 D1D2 2017 FN
Min (%) Av (%) Max (%) Min (%) Av (%) Max (%) Min (%) Av (%) Max (%) Min (%) Av (%) Max (%)
>0 20 30 43 8 16 29 20 32 47 35 48 63
>1000 4 11 21 1 6 13 6 14 26 15 26 40
>2000 0 2 5 0 1 5 1 4 11 4 10 21
>3000 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 1 4 0 3 8
>4000 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 3
>5000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
>6000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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ables and all the available capacity in Belgium (running at 85%).
These results are presented in the top 5 rows of Table 3. In a second
analysis the production from intermittent renewables was not
included (NO RES scenario, Table 3). By comparing these two anal-
yses, the ability of intermittent renewables to contribute to the
generation adequacy can be evaluated.
Fortunately, there is was no risk for a shortage in 2013. How-
ever, this risk will increase markedly in the coming years. In all
2017 scenarios there is a shortage risk. We observe a clear increase
in the import dependency of Belgium in times of high demand
(Max scenarios). Obviously, this risk decreases with increasing
nuclear capacity. In the most likely D1D2 scenario, there is a risk
of a shortage of more than 1000 MW (probability of 0.8% or 70 h/
year) in a year with high demand and a low renewables output
(the ‘‘Max” case). Even if all the nuclear plants’ lifetimes are
extended (FN scenario) the risk of a shortage remains. In the less
likely situation of not extending the lifetime of the Tihange reactor
(D1D2T1-scenario), the risk of a shortage above 1000 MW is very
real (1.9% in the ‘‘average” case).
Comparing the results that include the production by intermit-
tent RES with the ‘‘NO RES” results provides some interesting
insights. The probability of having a small shortage (0–1000 MW)
increases significantly in a NO RES scenario. In fact, it is more than
double compared to the ‘‘normal” scenarios. However, the proba-
bility of a high shortage does not decrease markedly. We can thus
conclude that PV and wind can indeed decrease the risk of a short-
age, be it in a limited way.
Demand sidemanagement and interconnections can partly solve
the shortage issues expected in Belgium. Fortunately, the intercon-
nection capacity of 4244 MW is higher than the predicted shortages
(which are never above 3000 MW). However, it is not certain that
the option to import electricity will always be available, it is risky
to count on imports in times of peak demand. The option to use
demand side management has been largely ignored in the past,
since there were no shortage problems before. However, demandsidemanagement is now receivingmore attention as a way forward
in the future. A recent survey has indicated that the potential for
demand side management from industry could be about 600 MW,
of which about 250 MWwould be very fast and flexible [8]. Unlock-
ing this potential would obviously be benefcial for the security of
supply in Belgium.Priority dispatch scenario
In this section we evaluate the risk of surpluses and shortages in
a world with priority dispatch for must run and intermittent
renewables. This can be considered a business as usual scenario,
since this is the case today in Belgium. In this scenario we assume
a load factor of 70% for the must run assets and a load factor of 85%
for the nuclear power plants. However, more flexible systems are
currently considered by the regulator in order to alleviate conges-
tion issues [22]. Therefore we also evaluate a more flexible sce-
nario on the next section.Surplus issues
In the model, a surplus occurs when demand is lower than the
sum of electricity produced by intermittent renewables, must run
and nuclear. The probability of a surplus is relatively high in all
cases (Table 4). However, only in the 2017 scenarios we find sur-
pluses above 4000 MW. Not surprisingly, the surpluses are highest
(>5000 MW) in the FN scenario, with a nuclear capacity of
5927 MW. When comparing the 2013 scenario and the 2017
D1D2-scenario, it is surprising to see that despite the decrease in
nuclear, the chance of a surplus (>0 MW) is very similar in both
scenarios. However, the chance of a big surplus (>3000 MW) is sig-
nificantly higher in the D1D2 scenario. This is due to the higher
share of intermittent renewables in the 2017 scenario. If a sunny
and windy day coincides with a low demand for electricity, this
will lead to high surpluses in 2017.
Table 5
Results of ‘‘priority dispatch” flex gap analysis for 2013 and 2017.
Flex gap (MW) 2013 2017 D1D2T1 2017 D1D2 2017 FN
Min (%) Av (%) Max (%) Min (%) Av (%) Max (%) Min (%) Av (%) Max (%) Min (%) Av (%) Max (%)
>0 70 82 91 82 91 97 67 80 89 50 65 78
>1000 46 61 72 63 76 87 44 59 72 28 43 56
>2000 22 37 50 40 55 68 23 37 50 11 22 34
>3000 8 16 26 20 33 46 9 18 29 3 9 16
>4000 1 5 9 7 15 25 2 6 12 0 2 5
>5000 0 0 1 0 5 10 0 1 3 0 0 0
>6000 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 6
Results of the ‘‘flexible must run” surplus analysis for 2013 and 2017.
Surplus (MW) 2013 2017 D1D2T1 2017 D1D2 2017 FN
Min (%) Av (%) Max (%) Min (%) Av (%) Max (%) Min (%) Av (%) Max (%) Min (%) Av (%) Max (%)
>0 0.0 2.1 6.4 0.1 1.6 5.4 0.9 5.1 11.9 4.6 11.4 22.2
>1000 0.0 0.2 1.3 0.0 0.3 1.8 0.0 1.3 4.7 0.5 3.5 9.1
>2000 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.2 1.6 0.0 0.8 3.4
>3000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.1 1.2
>4000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.4
>5000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
>6000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
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Shortages and surpluses are very important issues from a policy
perspective. For utilities, on the other hand, the capacity factors of
its assets are very important. A utility will only invest in new assets
when they are estimated to be profitable, which is highly depen-
dent on the capacity factors of these assets. In short, high capacity
factors (CF’s) will encourage investments, low CF’s, will discourage
investments. Due to the increasing amount of (intermittent)
renewables with priority dispatch, the CF’s of fossil fueled power
plants are decreasing [10], resulting in the closure and mothballing
of various gas plants in the EU. In this section we focus on this issue
by analyzing the ‘‘Flex Gap”. The Flex Gap quantifies the gap left to
fill for flexible (controllable) assets (in practice: hydro/gas/peak
plants) when demand is higher than the sum of electricity pro-
duced by renewables, must run and nuclear, but lower than total
available supply. In other words, we evaluate how many hours
per year flexible plants are necessary to match supply and demand.
The results from Table 5 indicate that there is definitely a high
need for flexible capacity. More than 5000 MW will be needed in
the 2017D1D2 scenario. Strikingly, this flexible capacity is only
needed a small amount of time. Focusing on 2017D1D2 scenario
we find that on average, there is only a need for more than
3000 MW during 18% of the time. With such low capacity factors,
no gas plant can be operated in an economical way. We see that
the flexible assets are pushed away by the combination of old
inflexible nuclear plants and renewables with priority dispatch.
These results indicate a paradox. On the one hand, we find that a
large amount of flexible assets will be needed to balance the grid
at all times. On the other hand, we find that these assets will only
be used for a limited amount of hours per year. Similar conclusions
were found in some recent reports [20,10,2,15]. This shows that
the profitability of flexible assets is an important issue in many
EU member states. Of course, the ‘‘priority dispatch” rule could
be adapted in order to partially cope with this issue. In the next
section we evaluate the effect of using the ‘‘must run” assets in a
more flexible way. One should be aware of the fact that many
options can be evaluated and compared (capacity remunerations,
load shedding, demand side management, . . .) in order to promote
reliability and/or flexiblity, but this goes beyond the scope of this
study.Flexible Must Run scenario
From the above mentioned results it is clear that intermittent
renewables and non flexible supply technologies (nuclear and
must run) do not match well in an electricity system. Given this
outcome and the fact that some MR-assets are in fact flexible by
nature an alternative scenario is evaluated. In this scenario, 50%
of the must run capacity is considered to be flexible. The minimal
load factor of MR is set at 35% instead of 70%.
Surplus issues
Table 6 shows that the increased flexibility significantly reduces
the surplus risk, both in 2013 and 2017. In the most likely case
(Average D1D2 case) the risk of a surplus above 1000 MW
decreases from 14% in the ‘‘priority dispatch” scenario to about
1% in the ‘‘Flexible Must Run” scenario. However, relatively high
peaks (>4000 MW) can still occur, be it very rarely (0.1% of the
time) and only in an extreme scenario with high wind/PV and
low demand (see Max 2017 scenarios).
Flex gap analysis
Table 7 shows that the Flex Gap also increases radically in a
more flexible scenario. The total amount of flexible assets that is
needed is a lot higher, but given the fact that half of the must
run capacity has become more flexible, this does not decrease
security of supply compared to the previous results (Table 5).
The amount of time that the flexible capacity can produce electric-
ity also increases. In the most likely D1D2 scenario more than
3000 MW of flexible capacity is needed during 44% of the time.
However, there is still a fairly big share of capacity that will only
be needed for a limited amount of time.
Conclusion and discussion
Our analysis of the near future of the Belgian electricity market
has revealed some intriguing issues and trade-offs. A first result,
important for the economy as a whole, is the increasing risk of a
shortage due to the nuclear phase out, in combination with a lack
of investments in new flexible generation and the mothballing or
termination of existing thermal plants. The increase in PV and
Table 7
Results of the ‘‘flexible must run” flex gap analysis for 2013 and 2017.
Flex gap (MW) 2013 2017 D1D2T1 2017 D1D2 2017 FN
Min (%) Av (%) Max (%) Min (%) Av (%) Max (%) Min (%) Av (%) Max (%) Min (%) Av (%) Max (%)
>0 94 98 100 95 98 100 89 95 99 78 89 95
>1000 77 88 95 86 94 99 73 85 93 58 72 84
>2000 54 68 78 70 82 91 52 67 79 35 50 64
>3000 29 45 58 48 63 76 30 44 57 16 29 42
>4000 12 22 34 26 40 53 12 24 36 5 12 21
>5000 0 8 14 0 21 32 4 9 17 1 4 8
>6000 0 1 3 0 8 14 0 2 6 0 0 1
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shortage (<2000 MW). However, the risk of a shortage of
3000 MW or more does not decrease significantly with increasing
intermittent generation. In other words, total system adequacy in
Belgium increases only to a very small extent by installing more
wind turbines or PV-systems. However, it can be increased a lot
more by an extension of the lifetime of the nuclear power plants.
Unfortunately, this will result in an increased surplus risk, some
of considerable size (>4000 MW). The risk of a shortage in Belgium
has been studied before and has been confirmed by others such as
the FOD-economy [12] and the University of Leuven [17].
In the winter of 2014–2015 the shortage risk in Belgium
reached unprecedented levels. This was the result of a combination
of various unforeseen issues. Two nuclear reactors (Doel 3 and
Tihange 2) were temporarily shut down in 2014 due to a problem
in the reactor vessel. This resulted in a drop in the available nuclear
capacity of about 2000 MW. In 2015, they remain closed until fur-
ther tests prove that the reactors are safe for normal use.4 In addi-
tion, an oil leak in another reactor (Doel 4) in the summer of 2014
aggravated the situation.5 However, this issue was resolved by the
end of December, just in time for the winter peak of January and
February in 2015. These issues resulted in the creation and publica-
tion of a ‘‘power shortage plan”, showing the regions and municipal-
ities that would have been cut off in the case of a shortage.6
Fortunately, the winter was mild, and no problems occurred. These
recent events were not incorporated in this study, which was
intended to focus on the impact of the ‘‘plan Wathelet”. However,
we can interpret these recent events as signs that the issues of
capacity shortages in Belgium are indeed very real. The winter of
2014–2015 was in fact a situation similar to our scenarios for 2017.
From the above observations, one would – rightfully – conclude
that more flexible generation will be needed to have a secure and
stable environment for electricity producers and consumers.
Unfortunately, an analysis of the load factors of flexible assets
shows that the number of hours left for flexible generation will
decrease further in the near future. In other words, the market cur-
rently does not provide the needed incentives for utilities to invest
in flexible generation. This problem also occurs in other European
countries such as the UK (Royal [21]. However, most of the must
run capacity is technically not as robust as the ‘‘must run” label
seems to indicate. If these technologies would be used more flexi-
bly, prospects for flexible generation technologies could improve.
In general, a multi-facetted approach is likely to be needed to
overcome these issues, focusing not only on the supply side
(scheduled maintenance, adapting feed-in status, curtailment of
wind or PV, flexible use of nuclear, . . .) but also on the transmission
and distribution side (increased interconnection and investments4 http://www.fanc.fgov.be/nl/news/doel-3/tihange-2-next-steps-of-the-review-
process/766.aspx.
5 http://deredactie.be/cm/vrtnieuws/binnenland/1.2057284.
6 http://www.elia.be/en/about-elia/questions-about-the-risk-of-shortage-in-
Belgium.in smart grids). The analysis shows that problems are already
occurring in 2017, so we need to act fast and choose short term
(adapting priority dispatch, increase demand side management
potential) solutions, while keeping long term solutions in mind
(increased reserve capacity, increased interconnection).
This study is mainly focusing on the Belgian electricity market;
nevertheless, many of the conclusions are applicable to other
regions. Many countries (Germany, the UK, Japan. . .) are currently
in a scenario of a nuclear (or coal) phase out in combination with
an increasing amount of renewables [25,15]. The risks for short-
ages or surpluses might be different from those in Belgium. How-
ever, the general conclusion that intermittent technologies will
radically change the functioning of the electricity market is appli-
cable in many countries [20]. These issues need to be analyzed and
solutions are needed urgently, given the long term investment
horizon for energy companies.
In general, the overall findings from this report – increased sur-
pluses and loss of profitability for gas assets - are in line with sim-
ilar studies for other countries, and also in line with recent
observations in Germany [1]. The main contribution of this study
is the use of a bootstrap-like methodology based on real data.
Applying this method to other nations can help to study the impact
of intermittent renewables elsewhere.
Further research will be needed to evaluate the Belgian electric-
ity market beyond 2017. The big drop in controllable assets in Bel-
gium in the period 2022–2028 requires our attention and will
definitely be an important topic for energy research in the future.Acknowledgements
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